IN RECENT YEARS, ON MAY 29, A VISITOR to Istanbul interested in escaping the crowds of foreign tourists at the city's many famous monuments and museums easily might have passed the day participating in a series of commemorations occurring throughout the city. Devoted to the anniversary of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, these events include public prayers at the mausoleum of Sultan Mehmed II, the laying of wreaths at three different statues of the sultan, and an impressive ceremony outside the city walls featuring speeches, music, dance, and colorfully dressed Ottoman soldiers who stage a dramatic reenactment of the moment when the imposing city walls were finally breached following a fifty-three-day siege. The day's celebrations are capped by an impressive musical laser and fireworks show projected over the Golden Horn, during which large crowds listen to an adulatory speech by the mayor of Istanbul and watch scenes from a film depicting the conquest of Constantinople. 1 In fact, these are the most visible among a broad range of cultural and sporting events organized on and around May 29, not only in Istanbul's many municipalities but in public venues throughout the country. 2 They are commemorative activities reinforced by a multitude of other, more permanent cultural references that reflect Turkish "memories" of the event. Bookstores, for instance, sell countless tomes devoted to the conquest, including both fictional works and translations into Turkish of the various European eyewitness accounts. A number of films and magazines are available as well. 3 At the same time, there are three universities in the city today with I would like to thank six anonymous reviewers and the editorial board of the American Historical Review for thoughtful and detailed comments on earlier drafts of this essay. An early version was presented at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London in 2010. Research was made possible through financial support from the Gerda Henkel Stiftung and from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
1 These events are covered in various Turkish newspapers. A detailed representation of 2010 celebrations is found in the May 2010 issue of Istanbul Bülteni.
2 Istanbul 'un Fethi'nin 558 Yıldönümü Kutlama Programı (Istanbul, 2011) . 3 For a brief overview of some of these trends, see Halim Kara, "The Literary Portrayal of Mehmed II in Turkish Historical Fiction," Literature and the Nation, Special Issue, New Perspectives on Turkey 36 (Spring 2007): 71-95; Sema Ugurcan, "Fatih Sultan Mehmet'in Romanı-Fatih Konulu Romanlar Ü zerine Bir Inceleme," in Yüksek Mimar Dr. I. Aydın Yüksel'e Armagan (Istanbul, 2012) , 312-327. In terms of film, along with various documentaries there is the popular animated film Fatih Sultan Mehmed (Ella Cartoon Studios, 1994) . It was originally produced in Turkish, but English-dubbed versions are also available. Popular history magazines feature 1453 each May, and the city of Istanbul publishes the annual names that reference the conquest directly, to say nothing of the Fatih Sultan Mehmed Bridge that spans the Bosphorus, connecting Europe with Asia. 4 Perhaps of most interest is an impressive museum, aimed primarily at Turks, located just outside the old city walls at Topkapı Gate, through which Sultan Mehmed II may have passed upon his initial entry into the city. Reportedly the most popular site in the country for Turkish tourists, the 1453 Panorama Museum draws visitors into a 360-degree experience of the siege of Constantinople, complete with dramatic three-dimensional paintings, sound effects, and weapons of war lying in the foreground. 5 The extent of this commemorative repertoire is impressive, if only because the conquest of Constantinople took place more than five and a half centuries ago-in 1453. It marked the ascendancy of the Ottomans as the preeminent dynasty not only in the Middle East, but also throughout the Mediterranean and Europe before the consolidation of Atlantic states that would come to be associated with the Age of Empire. For centuries, armies from the great Arab caliphates and then the emerging Ottoman Empire had unsuccessfully laid siege to the "second Rome," the seat of the once-illustrious Byzantine Empire. 6 Finally, subsequent to the siege in April-May
The Ottoman Empire covered vast territories, incorporating a remarkable diversity of ethnic and religious identities. The new ruling elite cultivated a distinct Ottoman language and culture; importantly, it was not until much later, in the nineteenth century, that a nascent nationalist ideology began to endow the term "Turk" with any significance. 8 Ultimately, with the surrender of the empire in World War I and its subsequent dissolution, a Turkish nationalism infused the new Republic of Turkey. Like every other successor state, from the Balkans to newly established Arab countries, Turkey explicitly rejected its Ottoman heritage to the point that the Ottoman Empire hardly figured in the new history of the nation. 9 Yet paradoxically, today, some ninety years after the founding of Turkey, the Ottoman legacy looms large. Moreover, the evidence suggests that for many Turks, especially residents of Istanbul, shared memories of May 29, 1453, are integral to national identity.
Acts of national commemoration are fluid in both form and meaning, contingent upon time and place as a country comes to terms with and manipulates the legacy of what preceded the nation-state. The state is instrumental to commemoration of the nation, and so acts of remembrance frequently reflect the needs of the moment as a country negotiates its place in the world. In Egypt, struggles against British dominance, the demise of the monarchy and the establishment of a military regime in 1952, and wars against Israel all resulted in a succession of commemorations and re-commemorations aimed at supporting the political status quo at any given time in the twentieth century. 10 Much more recently, in Vietnam the government declared the importance of remembering national heroes and revolutionary martyrs with the explicit purpose of buttressing current claims to territory also claimed by its neighbors. 11 In China, National Defense Education Day concentrates on moments in the recent past when pre-Communist China was subjected to humiliation by foreign im- (Berkeley, Calif., 1995) ; Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 2002) . The leading scholar in terms of the European sources (which constitute the majority) related to the siege is Marios Philippides, whose most recent compendium is Marios Philippides and Walter K. Hanak, The Siege and the Fall of Constantinople in 1453: Historiography, Topography, and Military Studies (Farnham, 2011) . 8 There exists a lively debate among scholars and a rapidly growing literature about the development and nature of Turkish nationalism in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. Particularly useful are David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876 -1908 (London, 1977 ; Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era (Leiden, 1992) ; Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908 -1918 (Berkeley, Calif., 1997 ; Erik Jan Zürcher, "Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics, 1908 -1938 ," in Kemal H. Karpat, ed., Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey (Leiden, 2000 , 150-179. 9 For a discussion of how various successor states negotiated the Ottoman legacy, see Albert Hourani, "The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East," in Kemal H. Karpat, ed., The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History (Leiden, 1974) , 61-78; L. Carl Brown, Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East (New York, 1996) ; Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford, 1997) . 10 Subsequent to the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, Egyptians once again face the challenge of rewriting history and determining what is and is not worthy of celebration. Israel Gershoni, "Imagining and Reimagining the Past: The Use of History by Egyptian Nationalist Writers, 1919 -1952 ," History and Memory 4, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 1992 perial powers. Of course, this can be a very useful tool should government wish to accentuate the anti-Japanese tendencies within Chinese nationalism today. 12 These celebrations were by no means automatic or spontaneous. Today Mexico, India, and Turkey each have a designated national holiday to mark the revolutionary moment that led to national independence, but political elites inaugurated these only as they consolidated control over a stabilizing society subsequent to drastic moments of political change and social modernization. 13 Typical of the modern nation-state, in these countries the official appropriation of the past in the form of regular sanctioned events is limited to moments associated exclusively with the history of the modern nation. Only on occasion does the invention of tradition extend further into the past, as when the Iranian shah, Muhammad Reza (r. 1941 Reza (r. -1979 , formally celebrated in 1971 at Persepolis the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire. 14 Even those countries that can claim to be direct successors to imperial states rarely if ever commemorate empire. China, a country that might usefully capitalize on its imperial heritage as it becomes a prominent power in the world today, so far has not done so in a serious manner. 15 Yet commemoration of a nation cannot simply be reduced to the efforts of manipulative state and government elites, although nascent nationalist movements surely did stage events "for the people, not by the people" in many cases. 16 To suc-ceed and endure, that nation must adequately incorporate identities that ordinary people project onto it. Numbers matter, and the more people who participate in celebrating the nation, the more "real" it becomes. 17 Thus the evident popularity in Turkey of a commemorative tradition related to May 29 reveals that a public memory built on an imperial legacy still resonates today. This shared memory is the result of negotiation over the course of modern Turkish history: it is "the intersection of official and vernacular cultural expressions." 18 Ultimately, when Turks participate in the multiple opportunities to remember Constantinople's conquest, they are contributing to and reinforcing the "continuous myth-making process" that infuses the nation with meaning. 19 Commemorative traditions associated with such a seminal event in Ottoman history, therefore, carry significant meaning that must be understood in terms of the dynamic relationship between the shaping and expression of public memory and the process by which people come to identify with their nation and its past. 20 IN HIS STUDY OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY, Pierre Nora provides a framework by which to appreciate the shifting meaning attached to commemoration in very different environments and eras. In premodern societies, ordinary people lived in the present, unconcerned with tracing linear historical narratives or with evaluating the moments that constituted their memories. By contrast, elites, who simultaneously supported and depended upon a ruling dynasty, participated in remembering the past so as to legitimate the present. 21 That these moments crystallized in text, monument, and ritual act is abundantly evident in how Ottomans commemorated the conquest of Constantinople. America, 1919 -1933 (New York, 2009 Set in their appropriate contexts, early Ottoman historical works reveal that among the elite, the production of "history" was very much a contested enterprise in the fifteenth century-around the time of Constantinople's conquest-just as a "literate historical imagination" took root. Sultan Mehmed II's imperial ambitions inspired numerous panegyrics, but so too his efforts at centralization caused chroniclers to give voice to discontent and resentment. At the same time, there also emerged a consecutive account of the past so as to present the ruling dynasty in terms of an enduring myth of Ottoman origins. 22 Infusing this historiography was a concern to legitimate the dynasty in religious terms, and so while the first Ottoman account of the capture of Constantinople was not entirely sympathetic to the rule of Mehmed II, its author, Tursun Beg, nonetheless emphasized the sultan's piety. Thus, Tursun Beg recorded that not only did the sultan visit the great Byzantine church, the Hagia Sophia, upon first entering the city, but later he ascended to the dome, from which he gazed over this symbol of the once-mighty Roman Empire. As many other sources also relate, he had already decreed that the Hagia Sophia should be consecrated as a mosque. This was part of his plan to convert churches into mosques and to turn Constantinople into an "Islamic city," thereafter to be known as Istanbul, or even "Islambol," city of abundant Islam. 23 With time, the events of 1453 became an uncontested element in an increasingly sophisticated imperial narrative that presented them in terms of the Muslim conquest of Christian Constantinople. 24 Later historians echoed Tursun Beg's argument that Mehmed the Conqueror's success set the Ottomans apart as the preeminent dynasty in Islamic history. 25 One of the great classics of sixteenth-century Ottoman historiography, The Crown of Histories, reflected the recent consolidation of the Ottoman dynasty as the defender of Sunni Muslim orthodoxy under Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520-1566). Thus the siege of Constantinople was cast in terms of an obedient act of jihad, while Mehmed II's success was understood as the ful- 22 The origins of Ottoman "historical consciousness" and the need to legitimate the present with reference to the past can be located in the early fifteenth century, following the near-destruction of the emergent empire by Timur in 1402. Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 93-97, 108-110; Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Â li (1541-1600) (Princeton, N.J., 1986), 238. 23 Under the Ottomans, the city was referred to variously as Constantinople (in Ottoman, Kostantiniyye), Istanbul, and "Islambol" (literally "where Islam abounds"). The latter term has been attributed to Sultan Mehmed II himself. On the derivation of these names, see Mordtmann, "Kustantiniyya"; and H. Inalcik, "Istanbul," fillment of a popular prophetic tradition, or hadith, that ostensibly foretold the capture of the city and the glory that would bring upon its conqueror. 26 In the next century, a much more embellished account of the siege by the traveler scholar Evliya Ç elebi revealed that this tradition of presenting Mehmed II as a pious and divinely blessed sultan remained vibrant in elite Ottoman society. 27 Ottoman elite culture in Istanbul also commemorated 1453 in more visible ways. Mehmed the Conqueror himself ensured this through the order to construct two permanent monuments that bore testimony to his achievements: a mosque complex (the "Fatih" Mosque) and the Topkapı Palace. These complemented the mosque that the sultan had commissioned outside the city walls at the site of the tomb of the revered companion of the Prophet Muhammad, Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, who had died at the siege of the city between 674 and 678; it quickly became a site of popular pilgrimage. 28 The Fatih Mosque itself-beside which Mehmed II's mausoleum is to be found-has inscribed at its entrance the Arabic text of the Prophet's hadith: "Constantinople will be conquered. Blessed is the commander who will conquer it, and blessed are his troops." The Topkapı Palace bears its own Arabic inscription, bestowing on Mehmed II titles that include "the Sultan of the Two Continents and the Two Seas, the Shadow of God in this World and the Next . . . the Conqueror of Constantinople, the Father of Conquest, Sultan Mehmed Khan." 29 Beginning in the early seventeenth century, these monuments came to be incorporated into a commemorative tradition associated with a sultan's accession to the throne. It was already customary for a new sultan to visit the tomb of Abu Ayyub al-Ansari in the district of Eyüp. Now he participated in the "girding of the sword" at the same site. A leading religious figure would bestow a sword-attributed variously to the Prophet or an early Ottoman sultan-on the young sultan, who would then process through the walls into the city, pausing en route to pay tribute at the mausoleum and mosque of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror. Similarly, the tradition of the sultan holding a Friday reception following his accession to the throne imitated Mehmed II's practice of doing so at the Hagia Sophia following the conquest of the city in 1453. 30 26 Hoca Sadeddin Efendi, Tacü-t Tevarih, ed. Ismet Parmaksızoglu, 5 vols. (Istanbul, 1974) 116-118; In the nineteenth century, this commemorative practice increasingly incorporated not only the elite but also large public crowds: it was a development closely associated with the emergence of nationalism. In France and the United States, nationalist narratives reflected a determination to break with history, but Ottoman nationalism resembled that in Britain, where the emphasis was upon continuity with the past. 31 The Young Ottomans were the most prominent advocates of an "Ottoman nation" that, liberally defined, might incorporate the wide range of ethnic-and for some, even religious-diversity characteristic of the empire. At the same time, various ethnic nationalisms also took root among segments of the population. One of these was a cultural Turkish nationalism, and ethnic Turkish roots became a new source of pride among some members of the Ottoman elite. Neither locus of identity, it should be stressed, envisioned the nation as separate from Islamic tradition. Moreover, the tendency for these currents to employ the terms "Ottoman" and "Turk" interchangeably-and hence the failure to articulate a distinct terminology-indicated a desire to remain rooted in the legacy of empire itself. 32 Central to this legacy was Ottoman control of Constantinople, and a new literature devoted to remembering its conquest coincided with the gradual articulation of Ottoman nationalism. According to Nora, this is entirely in keeping with the intimate relationship between nationalism and commemoration: the need to articulate a sacred narrative of the history of the "holy nation" naturally resulted in the quintessential milieu de mémoire, with an emphasis on public recognition of specific but connected moments from the past. 33 Previous Ottoman tradition had been to incorporate the event into dynastic or universal histories. However, it was a modernizing sultan, Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839), who commissioned two accounts devoted exclusively to the quest to capture Constantinople. One, an Arabic work, specifically chronicled the many martyrs who had died while laying siege to the city over the centuries. The other, an Ottoman treatise by Imamazade Es ad Efendi (d. 1851), was devoted to the significance of Mehmed II's success at fulfilling the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, and to justifying later Ottoman claims to the caliphate. Written for the sultan rather than for the public, this work was very much a product of elite culture, but it is best understood in terms of Mahmud II's own concern to present himself as a pious leader in the midst of an era of reform that would change the very nature of the Ottoman state's relationship to the sultan's subjects. 34 Namık Kemal (r. 1840 Kemal (r. -1888 , the prominent Young Ottoman who actively con- 43-46. tributed to the new print media that were transforming Ottoman society after the reign of Mahmud II, wrote extensively about 1453. At first, inspired by the actual anniversary in 1862 of Constantinople's conquest, Kemal produced a brief panegyric. 35 It was written in an ornate Ottoman language hardly accessible to the public, but within a few years he was using a very different, much simpler style to serialize vignettes of Ottoman history in the newspaper Tasvir-i Efkar, with the goal of inculcating pride in the Ottoman nation. 36 This included exalting Mehmed the Conqueror's heroic and enlightened character, which Kemal would elaborate on further in an entirely separate short biography published in 1872 (1289). 37 At a time when the integrity of the empire was under tremendous strain as a result of internal strife and conflict with foreign powers, Kemal was devoted to nourishing a Muslim Ottoman identity based on seminal moments and figures that included Ottoman sultans and other heroic figures, most notably the Ayyubid Sultan Saladin (r. 1174 -1193), famous for his recapture of Jerusalem during the Crusades in 1187. Representing these distant figures to an emergent Ottoman public, Kemal "endowed heroes with political and social intentions inconceivable before the time at which he was writing." 38 Thus he credited Sultan Mehmed II with transforming the Ottoman state into a "civilized society" that Kemal readily identified as a nation (millet ). 39 Ultimately, it is in Namık Kemal's posthumously published history of the early Ottoman Empire that we note the identification of 1453 as a seminal moment in the Ottoman historical narrative that prevailed at the turn of the twentieth century. Grounding an extensive account of Constantinople's conquest in both non-Ottoman sources and the works of Western historians, he emphasized Turks rather than Ottomans. 40 Equally significant was his departure from tradition as he cast the event not as an act of jihad best understood in terms of a clash of civilizations, but rather as a pivotal event in world history. Without equal, Mehmed II embodied the virtues of justice, tolerance, and humanity; his victory marked the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of a new, modern era. Whereas European authors had long interpreted 1453 as a catastrophe, Kemal now asserted that it had been of great benefit to all of human civilization. 41 35 This was his Barika-i Zafer. According to Mehmet Kaplan, it was originally written in 1862 (1278), at the time of the anniversary of Constantinople's conquest. According to Iskender Pala, it was not published until 1872, some ten years later. A transliterated version of the text is in Iskender Pala, Namık Kemal'in Tarihi Biyografileri (Ankara, 1989), 196-205 Kemal'in Tarihi Biyografileri, 99, 113. 40 Written over a long period in Namık Kemal's life, the portion about Constantinople's conquest was written in his final years, while he was working as an Ottoman official on the island of Rhodes. The entire four-volume Ottoman History was not published until 1908. In this work he relied heavily on both Ottoman and European sources for his account of the siege of 1453. Significantly, he also went to considerable effort to criticize European scholarship associated with the siege of Constantinople. See Namık Kemal, Osmanlı Tarihi, ed. Mücahit Demirel, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 2005) , 2: 159-200. 41 Kemal had already made these assertions in his earlier biography of Mehmed II, "Fatih." Pala, Namık Kemal'in Tarihi Biyografileri, . The seventeenth-century German scholar Christophe Cellarius, who first divided history into three eras-antiquity, a middle age, and modern times-proposed that the fall of Constantinople in 1453 delineated the beginning of modern history. However, by the time At a time, therefore, when nationalist ideologies came to infuse Ottoman politics and when elites sought to preserve the empire in a rapidly changing world, Ottomans not only identified 1453 as an important moment in their own historical narrative, but used it to demonstrate the value of their imperial nation to world history. In 1900, the Istanbul newspapers Servet and Malumat published articles echoing Namık Kemal's sentiments, stressing that the new age ushered in had been characterized by freedom of conscience and religion. Moreover, an encyclopedic account of the siege published in the same year called upon Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876 II (r. -1909 to formally commemorate the 450th anniversary in 1903. 42 Yet it was only following the distinct break in Ottoman political history represented by the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 that Ottomans actually came together to formally commemorate Constantinople's conquest. In the charged atmosphere of those days, public celebration of the past was an ideal means to legitimate the present, and in 1910 residents of Istanbul were enthusiastic participants in what was the first formal commemoration. 43 Only four years later, however, the start of World War I and then the emergence of the new Turkish Republic, infused by an elite Turkish nationalism that treated the Ottoman past with contempt, guaranteed that future national recognition NOTHING CAPTURES BETTER THE common association between the Republic of Turkey and the Ottoman legacy than the attitude of its founding president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (r. 1923 -1938 , toward Sultan Mehmed II and the city that he conquered. Atatürk was both a modernizer and an iconoclast. He understood that in the new world of nations, the "Turks" had a difficult future: ridiculed as the "sick man of Europe" before 1914, now they were reviled as responsible for the near-total eradication of the Christian population of Anatolia during World War I. 44 It is little surprise, therefore, that he set out to transform Turkey into a modern nation severed from its Ottoman Islamic roots. In a manner reminiscent of France in the late eighteenth century, Kemalism-as Atatürk's nationalist ideology came to be known-broke with the immediate past. Consequently, it was necessary to create a new Turkish milieu de mémoire that would imbue the nation with a sacred history linked to a more ancient past-a narrative that would constitute the basis for a new collective memory to be inculcated in the citizens of modern Turkey.
Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State
As the imperial seat of a line of sultans who had eventually capitulated in 1918 and the site of a humiliating Allied occupation during the War of Independence, the city of Constantinople symbolized all that was antithetical to the modern Turkish nation. 45 Consequently, Atatürk designated Ankara the new capital, while he himself refused to even visit Istanbul following the conclusion of the war. 46 In October 1922, he had appointed his ally Refet Bele military governor over Eastern Thrace. At that point the nationalist government had not yet publicly rejected the Ottoman dynasty, so Bele's arrival in Istanbul was notable for the fact that he paid tribute to a longstanding Ottoman tradition: his first act was to visit the mausoleum of Sultan Mehmed II. Later, Bele took the symbolism one step further and preached a rousing sermon to a large crowd gathered at the Hagia Sophia for Friday prayers. 47 Within a few weeks, however, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey had dissolved the 44 And subsequently, in September 1922, at the end of the War of Independence, for the campaign that drove the Greek army and remaining Greek population out of Anatolia. In the late nineteenth century, European intellectuals had placed "Turks" at the bottom of their racial hierarchies. See M. Şükrü Hanioglu, The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford, 1995), 209. 45 In the early years of the republic, the city came to be officially referred to as Istanbul, perhaps both to remove any association with its imperial past and to counter Greek nationalist claims to the city. Ottomans, as had Europeans, had continued to use the name Constantinople (New York, 1999) , 392. The brief discussion of this matter in the Grand National Assembly is in TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi 2, no. 1 (13 Teşrinievvel 1339): 618. See Duygu Kacar, "Ankara, a Small Town, Transformed to a Nation's Capital," Journal of Planning History 9, no. 1 (2010): 43-65. 47 This was on the eve of the Lausanne Conference and the decision by the Grand National Assembly to abolish the sultanate at the start of November 1922. Revealingly, the new caliph, Abdülmecid, asked the government's permission to be allowed to appear in public in the same robes and turban that Sultan sultanate, and the Turkish government turned its back on both the Ottoman Empire and Constantinople. When Mustafa Kemal finally deigned to visit Istanbul in July 1927, he made no pretense of honoring the Ottoman dynasty. He did not visit Mehmed II's mausoleum, but arrived at Dolmabahçe Palace on the Bosphorus, where he immediately received an audience. Alluding to a common title used by Ottoman sultans, he unhesitatingly declared, "The palace belongs no longer to the Shadows of Allah on Earth, but to the nation, which is a fact and not a shadow, and I am happy to be here as an individual member of the nation, as a guest." 48 As Atatürk's words implied, in what was a cult of new beginnings, the Ottoman Empire had become the much-derided, even illegitimate, ancien régime as soon as the sultanate was abolished at the end of October 1922. Atatürk himself criticized Mehmed II as one of the sultans who had sought to expand Ottoman territory for their own personal benefit. While "Turks" had sacrificed themselves on his behalf, other peoples-or nations-had worked the land and secured their own wealth and well-being. Ultimately, Ottoman sultans had pursued personal power and riches, to the point that the "Turkish nation" had scarcely survived. 49 In accordance with this reading of the past, Kemalist politics rejected the Ottoman legacy. Thus in 1925, Atatürk ordered that the mausoleums of Ottoman sultans be closed to the public: they were no longer allowed to be places of pilgrimage. Later, in 1934, he personally signed an order declaring that the Hagia Sophia would no longer function as a mosque but rather would become a museum testifying to a bygone era. 50 Replacing these sites of Ottoman-oriented commemoration was a new narrative centered on the person of Atatürk himself. Imposing statues of "the father of the Turks" were erected throughout the country, and each year a series of anniversaries kindled public memory of Atatürk's central role in the miraculous rescue and rebirth of the nation. 51 Hagia Sophia, 1850 -1950 : Holy Wisdom, Modern Monument (Chicago, 2004 .
51 "The father of the Turks" is the meaning of the word "Atatürk." 52 Initially popular, these anniversaries were vigorously promoted by schools, local officials, and the Ultimately, in 1935 the government declared October 29 to be Republic Day, a national holiday set apart from all others. Also known as "the holiday of reforms," this date reminded Turks that their nation was founded upon an explicit repudiation of the Ottoman Empire and all that it represented. 53 Already in 1933 the young republic had celebrated its tenth anniversary on this date, when the government employed a commemorative ceremony reinforced by popular publications to convey the idea that life in the Ottoman Empire had been corrupt and decadent as compared to the progress and civilization already achieved by the Turkish Republic. 54 For all that Kemalist ideology derided the Ottoman past, however, in practice there was much more ambiguity between republic and empire than the political history of reform has allowed for. Lived memories of the once and glorious empire did not simply evaporate, and in a country defined by Ottoman architecture and cultural practices, the imperial legacy could not be erased. 55 Newspapers across the country may have toed the official line and ignored Ottoman history, but popular literature in the form of novels and poetry continued to feature it. 56 More to the point, government-authorized school history textbooks contained the formula by which the new nationalist narrative could in fact be reconciled with and incorporate the Ottoman Empire.
Kemalist ideologues posited an exaggerated scheme of world history in which the ancient Turkish nation was cast as the original source of all human civilization. 57
People's Houses and People's Rooms. In the 1940s, however, public interest in and support for these celebrations declined significantly. There is a gradually expanding literature on national commemoration in early republican Turkey. Ö ztürkmen, "Celebrating National Holidays in Turkey"; Roy, "Seeing Like Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey, 1923 -1945 (Syracuse, N.Y., 2013 .
53 Ö ztürkmen, "Celebrating National Holidays in Turkey," 71. The Grand National Assembly debated and passed this law (#2739) on May 27, 1935. Discussion surrounding it can be found in TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi 5, no. 3 (May 27, 1935) : 302-304. 54 The Republican People's Party broadsheet aimed at the general public, Yurt, was first issued on October 29, 1933. Along similar lines, see Osmanlı Imparatorlugundan Türkiye Cumhuriyetine: Nasıldı, Nasıl Oldu? (Istanbul, 1933); Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 1923 -1933 On Yıl Kitabı (Istanbul, 1933 Açısından Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Romanı, 1920 -1946 (Istanbul, 2002 . Discussions of the actual representation of 1453 in early republican poetry and literature are in Kazım Yetiş, ed., Türk Edebiyatında Istanbul 'un Fethi ve Fatih (Istanbul, 2005) . 57 This was based on a cultural Turkish nationalism that had emerged in the late nineteenth century. Kuran, "Ottoman Historiography of the Tanzimat Period." English-language scholarly literature on this aspect of Kemalist ideology is limited. There were two distinct aspects to it: the Turkish Historical Thesis and the Sun Language Theory. Although their articulation was limited largely to the 1930s, their influence is evident in subsequent decades Turkish migrants from Central Asia had been responsible for the spread of civilization to all corners of the earth, and by implication, even modern Western civilization was itself Turkish in origin. World history, therefore, was an account of the many instances in which the Turkish nation had played the pivotal role. It was a narrative in which the Ottoman Empire, for all its six hundred years, was accorded only a minor, and generally negative, role: thus the decadence and decline that started in the sixteenth century and threatened the very existence of the nation were explicitly blamed on the actions of "the Ottomans." 58 Nevertheless, Ottoman history did have some moments worth exploiting, and these were suitably attributed not to Ottomans but to "Turks." Foremost among them were the events of 1453, and one of the earliest republican texts actually dated the beginning of "Turkish history" to the conquest of Constantinople. 59 Similarly, a 1931 text that offered a scathing interpretation of Ottoman history in general nonetheless echoed the earlier assertion made by Namık Kemal that it was in 1453 that the Turks had brought about the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern era. 60 The sacred history of the nation had been modified to allow for such a seminal event. In this particular case, the Ottomans had become Turks.
IT WAS ONLY AFTER THE DEATH of Atatürk in 1938, however, that commemorative practice in Turkey came to reflect this Kemalist appropriation of the imperial past to the national present. Indeed, the year 1953 marked the moment when commemoration came to reflect not only elite ideals but the emergence of a public memory. By this point, Turks were becoming active participants in a vital public culture that accompanied the introduction of multi-party politics in the wake of World War II. 61 Authoritarian Kemalist nationalism proved to be at odds with more popular conceptions of identity, and the process of working out a Turkish democratic tradition necessitated the generation of a truly national narrative to which a majority of Turks could subscribe. Kemalism retained its dominant status, but a nascent commemorative tradition related to Constantinople's conquest facilitated the fusion of the Ottoman past to the prevailing nationalist milieu de mémoire. The result was, for the first time, the crystallization of a popular national identity infused by a new public memory.
In 1953, Turks broke with the young Kemalist tradition and formally marked an anniversary that acknowledged the importance of Ottoman history-the quincentenary of the capture of Constantinople. Multi-party politics and an expanding com- MultiParty System, 1938 -1950 (Albany, N.Y., 2005 petitive print culture had given voice to widespread popular interest in the Ottoman past. 62 Increasingly, not only historical novels, but also daily newspapers and weekly periodicals-produced in both Istanbul and the provinces-as well as films featured the stories of Ottoman personalities, society, culture, and politics. 63 The prevailing tone indicated a respect for and a curiosity about the Ottoman past-a recognition that all six centuries constituted an integral part of the nation's history of which Turks were justifiably proud. School history texts echoed this sentiment, as the terms "Ottoman" and "Turk" came to be used interchangeably, each endowed with respect and pride. 64 It was in this context, almost immediately upon Atatürk's death, that officials in Istanbul had begun to explore the possibility of establishing a commission to restore one of the most potent symbols of the Ottoman past: the mosque, school, and mausoleum that bore Sultan Mehmed II's name. 65 Scarcely three years later, the Ministry of Education and the Turkish Historical Association were among a number of state institutions to enter into discussions concerning how best to commemorate the looming quincentenary of the Ottoman capture of Constantinople. The result was a proposal that at least seventeen government ministries and institutions should become involved, and that a budget of some 17.3 million lira should be allotted for the event. 66 Concurrently, in 1946 the Istanbul daily Yeni Sabah drew attention to the anniversary on May 29, while in 1948 the religious journal Selamet and the nationalist publication Ç ınaraltı both devoted commemorative issues to the 495th anniversary. 67 In these they reminded the government and readers that a unique and much more important anniversary loomed only five years hence. Ultimately, in Feb- 62 As a result of changes to laws regulating the press in 1946 and then 1950. Brockett, How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk, chap. 3.
63 Increasingly after 1945, major Istanbul newspapers-as well as those in provincial centers-began to feature serialized novels that portrayed the Ottoman past in exotic and exciting terms. Particularly prominent were the novels of Feridun Tülbentçi. A reader might find the front page of a newspaper featuring a dramatic picture of a sword-wielding, turbaned sultan as part of an advertisement for a story. Newspapers also carried cartoons dealing with Ottoman history. For August 6, 1950 , November 14, 1950 , and May 29, 1951 Hürriyet (Istanbul) , June 30, 1949, and May 29, 1950. ruary 1950, discussions led to the establishment of an association dedicated to organizing not only the 500th anniversary of the conquest but also subsequent anniversaries. 68 Press coverage from the period reveals that both the Istanbul Conquest Association and the government struggled to meet public expectations for celebrations associated with the quincentenary of a signal moment in the nation's past. The Istanbul press reported on the restoration of Sultan Mehmed II's mausoleum and mosque, but when it came to the graves of many of the martyrs of the conquest spread across the city, it complained that much of the work remained unfinished. 69 A statue of Mehmed the Conqueror had not materialized despite a public competition to solicit designs, while the graves of some important figures had been completely forgotten, and many remained quite literally mired in mud. On not a few occasions, Istanbul periodicals published cartoons ridiculing those in charge of the commemoration-the mayor in particular-no doubt capturing the frustration felt by many in Istanbul. 70 For all that the quincentenary provided fodder for critics of government, print media also reveal that the celebrations were popular and successful. Unlike the tenth-anniversary celebrations of the republic in 1933, the first formal celebration of Constantinople's conquest in Turkey was not simply choreographed by the country's political elite. It offered multiple opportunities for the people to actively contribute to the process by which the nation remembered its past. In the weeks leading up to May 29, newspapers across the country informed readers about what they might expect. They published editorials, serialized stories, cartoons, and pictures that fueled public excitement. When the day itself arrived, these same publications formed part of an impressive print culture that included dozens of books, collections of poetry, comic books, brochures, and magazines issued especially for the anniver- 17.98.42 (August 14, 1950) . 69 The government allocated 500,000 lira for repairs to the complex surrounding the Fatih Mosque. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 9.13.50 S. Sayısı 51 (February 28, 1952) ; Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), May 14, 16, and 27, 1953; Hürriyet (Istanbul), May 28, 1953; Vatan (Istanbul) , January 2 and May 28, 1953. 70 Nothing more than a small bust of Mehmed II materialized, this outside Istanbul University. Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), March 3, 1951, and June 26, 1953; Akbaba (Istanbul), May 26, 1953; Hürriyet (Istanbul), May 14 and June 4, 1953; Vatan (Istanbul), May 6, 9, and 30, 1953 . For discussion in the Grand National Assembly about the matter of a commemorative statue, see TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 9.18.12.67-68 (December 3, 1952 Significantly, May 29, 1953 , was a national day of celebration, in that it was not limited to Istanbul alone. Provincial representatives and groups of schoolchildren were invited to travel to Istanbul to take part in the festivities. Some of them participated in the folk dances representing local culture and customs that took place in public venues during the week following the anniversary. At the official ceremony on May 29, they would contribute to the symbolism by sprinkling dirt brought from the provinces at the mausoleum of Mehmed the Conqueror. For the majority who remained in the provinces, there were at least two ways to participate in the commemoration. First, May 29 was a Friday, and so when Turks attended weekly prayers at the local mosque-as they did in large numbers-they listened to a sermon issued by the Presidency of Religious Affairs and dedicated to 1453. Secondly, many provincial cities also hosted their own public ceremonies. Newspapers reported wellattended events in local schools or sports arenas in cities such as Balıkesir, Bursa, Erzurum, and Zonguldak. In the Central Anatolian city of Kayseri, for example, schools at all levels held special events at which teachers and local officials delivered speeches. 73 As so often occurred on the occasion of national holidays, children and their parents were encouraged to participate by reciting poetry that they had written to recall this glorious time. Everywhere, of course, what had originally been a distinct moment in Ottoman history was now cast as a foundational event in Turkish national history; it was an interpretation encouraged by the playing of the Turkish national anthem and the flying of the Turkish flag at each and every commemoration.
In Istanbul itself, May 29 was the first of ten days of organized events. On that day official ceremony gave way to carefully scripted reenactments at which large numbers of people were spectators. Events began outside the old city walls, at a pavilion resembling that of Sultan Mehmed II, erected between the Topkapı and Edirne Gates. Here a distinguished group of dignitaries gathered. Among the invited guests were a group of ten Grand National Assembly deputies, foreign consuls to Istanbul, and delegates from provincial cities as close as Edirne and as far away as Kars. 74 Of considerable significance was the fact that the party included official mem- 74 As will be noted later, neither the president, the prime minister, nor the foreign minister (the noted historian Mehmed Fuad Köprülü) participated.
bers from Istanbul's Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities-representing the very people who had lived in Constantinople before its conquest and then been incorporated within the Ottoman Empire. Addressed by Istanbul's mayor, Professor Fahreddin Kerim Gökay, they were reminded that Sultan Mehmed II had been a humble, magnanimous ruler who was greeted when he entered the conquered city 
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Gavin D. Brockett AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 2014 a military band played Turkey's national anthem; however, the dignitaries were accompanied on their journey into the city by a corps of Ottoman Janissaries decked out in full regalia and bearing Sultan Mehmed II's own banner. The procession proceeded through the Topkapı Gate, following the route by which Mehmed II himself had first entered Constantinople. 76 It paused at the point where tradition said that Ulubatlı Hasan, the first "Turk" to successfully surmount the fortifications, allegedly planted a flag and then died a martyr's death. Here a brief ceremony commemorated all those (Turkish) martyrs who died in the final battle on May 29. The procession then moved along to the great Mosque of the Conqueror, where the dignitaries were joined by academics and representatives of the Turkish military, as well as large crowds. Following Friday prayers in the mosque, they then paid their respects to Mehmed the Conqueror by visiting his mausoleum and witnessing a parade of Turkish military units accompanied by their bands, and of children from Istanbul's schools. Concurrently, another procession consisting of Turkish sailors pulling a model of an Ottoman galleon made its way up from the Golden Horn; this was an unmistakable allusion to Mehmed II's remarkable feat of transporting the Ottoman fleet overland from the Bosphorus to the Golden Horn. Pictures from the day suggest that these processions into the city were cheered on by huge crowds who lined the streets, having arrived early to ensure themselves a good view. Newspapers estimated the size of the crowds at between 100,000 and 500,000. 77 With bands playing, Turkish flags (as well as a few Ottoman banners) waving, cannons firing, the call to prayer ringing from mosque minarets, and the Turkish air force flying overhead, the celebrations were both loud and colorful. Later in the afternoon, the focus shifted to Istanbul University, where a ceremony commemorated the so-called founding of this institution-in other words, a religious school or medrese-five hundred years earlier. 78 May 29 concluded with a fireworks display, but in fact it was only the first of ten full days of celebration that invited people to actively participate in their own remembering of the nation's history. Activities appealed to a variety of interests. At Istanbul University as well as at other venues, Turkish academics gave presentations on various aspects of Ottoman and Byzantine history; a few foreign Orientalists evidently participated, although no large academic conference was held in Istanbul. 79 76 Interestingly, although the very presence of a corps of Janissaries and other Ottoman soldiers was highly symbolic, no attempt appears to have been made to imitate Mehmed II himself: there was no "sultan" riding a white horse, as occurred in more recent commemorative ceremonies up to and including that in 2011.
77 Vatan (Istanbul), May 30, 1953; The Times (London), May 30, 1953; New York Times, May 30, 1953; 500 üncü Fetih Yılı Şenlik Albümü (Istanbul, 1953) . 78 Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), May 30, 1953. Istanbul University officially took this name in 1933. It derived from the Ottoman Dar al-Funun, which was formally established in 1900. This institution in turn traces its roots back to the medrese established in association with the mosque of Fatih Sultan Mehmed II. The sultan was indeed a man of learning who established many medreses in Istanbul and who had a keen interest in the world beyond Ottoman control. On this see Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time ; Inalcik, "Istanbul"; C. K. Zurayk, "Dja mi a," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, http: //referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/djamia-COM_0181. 79 In the weeks leading up to the anniversary, various small conferences were also held in Istanbul. Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), May 6 and 25, 1953. The anniversary attracted some international attention as well. One event that did not take place was a meeting of an international Muslim congress. A Turkish delegate to a similar meeting in Pakistan in 1952, Nuri Demirag, proposed a meeting in Istanbul of At public schools across the city, special events also marked the conquest: these included displays of art, historic costumes, and of course numerous speeches. Various athletic events such as football (soccer), gymnastics, wrestling, and equestrian competitions took place in the city's stadiums. Folk dances took place on Friday, June 5, while throughout the ten days, residents of Istanbul could attend special concerts; the State Opera and Theater Company performed various pieces, including a new play, The Conqueror (Fatih). 80 Accompanying these celebrations was a less public but no less significant gesture on the part of the government, as it issued an extensive set of new stamps that captured those aspects of the conquest of Constantinople that Turks preferred to recall: included were images of Rumeli Hisarı, the great fortress on the Bosphorus; the cannon used to batter Constantinople's defenses; the ships hauled over Pera and to the Golden Horn; Mehmed II granting authority over the Greek Orthodox Church to the new Greek patriarch; the mausoleum of Mehmed II; and of course images of the Conqueror himself. 81 THE SUCCESS OF COMMEMORATIONS in 1953, combined with the evident importance of Constantinople's conquest in Turkish public memory now sixty years later, stands in distinct contrast to the fact that for other nations the imperial heritage has posed a significant problem: its commemoration no longer remains integral to public identification with the nation. In fact, commemoration of events associated with nowvanished empires is not common. For the modern nation-state, post-imperial memory constitutes a very real challenge: the legacy of empire rarely provides reason to celebrate. Dozens of countries from Latin America to East Asia that attained independence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries explicitly frame national identity in distinct opposition to the imperial domination that they experienced for decades, even centuries. In these cases, imperial history, in which they had no choice but to participate, constitutes a foil against which is set a narrative of struggle that ultimately leads to national liberation. Naturally this narrative includes seminal moments that the new nation-state identifies as worthy of celebration, and national holidays commemorate not the imperial legacy, but only those events connected to the nation's newfound independence. In this case, imperial history is accorded little if any positive place in the new public memory. 82 Muslims from around the world to coincide with the quincentenary. The Turkish government refused to permit such an event. 81 Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), May 9, 1953 . Copies of these were included in a special 500th-anniversary issue of Resimli Hayat.
82 A rejection of empire is not the only theme that infuses national celebrations, but it is present in almost every case, whether implicitly or explicitly. Scholarly analysis of national commemorations is informed by the rich theoretical foundation of studies of nationalism as an imagined or invented tradition-a foundation laid by such prominent scholars as Benedict Anderson, Prasenjit Duara, Eric Modern states that themselves were once imperial powers also cultivate public memory that is hardly any more likely to incorporate the imperial past into the national historical narrative. Painfully embarrassing atrocities and episodes of oppression overshadow what were once glorious imperial narratives. These nations must now wrestle with such truths in light of the bitter critiques that emerged in the context of decolonization and subsequent postcolonial analyses. 83 To be sure, many people in these countries still cling to sanitized versions of history, while governments have not entirely given up on trying to preserve a degree of imperial dignity that justifies exerting influence over territories they once controlled: the British Commonwealth and the Organisation international de la Francophonie are but the most obvious examples of this. 84 So too former metropolises such as London, Paris, and Berlin are home to museums that pay tribute to their earlier economic and military power: they commemorate men who died upholding empire, and they proudly display archaeological artifacts that former subjects now seek to repatriate to their rightful homes. 85 Nevertheless, the pomp and circumstance that once accompanied this im-perial dominance are gone, and these countries, too, now celebrate only national holidays. Empire Day, a prominent event in early-twentieth-century Britain, is no more than a faint memory of the past. 86 That major milestones such as quincentenaries are no more conducive to celebration was abundantly evident in 1992, when colonizers and colonized alike had the rare opportunity to commemorate the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus's voyages across the Atlantic and so-called discovery of, or encounter with, the Americas. So widespread was the impact of the events of 1492 that five centuries later, their commemoration involved many countries on both sides of the Atlantic. As is their wont, governments sought to use history for the purpose of current agendas, even as debates raged about not only how but whether 1492 should be celebrated. 87 Commemorative events unfolded variously, according to specific issues current in each country: in the United States and Mexico, organizing committees struggled with public controversy to the point that their efforts were largely eclipsed, while more successful celebrations in Spain and the Dominican Republic were followed by widespread criticism that they hardly justified the vast expenditures of money incurred by government. 88 Quite apart from the efforts of government, scholars on both sides of the Atlantic seized on the anniversary to thoroughly revise historical interpretations of Columbus and European expansion into the Americas-this in distinct contrast to the hagio-graphic tone that had characterized commemorations in 1892. 89 Much had changed over a century, and in 1992 there was a pervasive critique of Columbus's personality 
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and of the impact of European empire upon the indigenous populations of the Americas. In Latin America, intellectuals who had long challenged the benefits of colonialism saw little reason to commemorate the anniversary. 90 By the 1990s, many scholars in North America and Europe had also adopted this perspective. All in all, those who identified 1992 as worthy of commemoration "set out to celebrate an imperial past but found themselves confronting difficult questions about the rise of colonialism, the destruction of Native American societies, and the disruption of biological habitats throughout the globe." 91 In light of the controversy that surrounded this one signal event, it is little wonder that European empire, increasingly the object of scholarly scrutiny, is rarely the subject of public celebration today. 92 COMMEMORATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE'S CONQUEST is the exception that proves the rule. 98 At a ceremony outside the city walls, Erbakan's protégé, Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan, used the opportunity to publicly challenge the military's role in Turkey's politics. He told those gathered that he prayed for divine restoration of the same religious freedoms established by Mehmed II; while in response, Yavuz Kadirdag, the ranking officer, spoke of the importance of the military to protecting Atatürk's secular, democratic state. The next year, in 1998, the governor of Istanbul refused to give permission to the youth association associated with Erbakan (Milli Gençlik Vakfı) to commemorate the anniversary: thus celebrations were moved to a stadium in the northwestern Anatolian city of Sakarya. 99 These events were characteristic of the decades of political turmoil finally On this occasion, with Erbakan as prime minister, the Ministry of Culture also allowed celebrations to take place at Rumeli Hisarı, the fortress originally built in 1452. In previous years, requests to hold events here had been denied. 98 See also the Istanbul press for the days surrounding May 29 in 1994 May 29 in , 1995 May 29 in , 1996 May 29 in , and 1998 Milliyet (Istanbul), May 30, 1997, and 30, 1998. 100 Erdogan was the mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998 before being banned from politics by the National Security Court. After its electoral victory, the Justice and Development Party used its majority to alter the law, thus enabling Erdogan to enter the Grand National Assembly and assume the role of prime minister. On Erdogan's early political career, see Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle, 2002), 137-148. power, he himself has begun to manipulate public memory of the conquest of Constantinople while facing criticism for interfering with official commemorations of republican anniversaries associated with Atatürk. 101 It was his government that initiated the 1453 Panorama Museum. In 2012, Erdogan curiously decided that May 29 celebrations would not occur in the traditional location outside the city wall: instead, a series of events, including a "victory walk" to the Hagia Sophia, would take place in the heart of the Sultanahmet tourist district. 102 Meanwhile, not coincidentally, on that same day he delivered a speech at the opening of Mehmed the Conqueror's newly refurbished mosque, later announcing plans to construct yet another massive mosque. Situated on the opposite side of the city above Istanbul's Asian shore and visible from all parts of the city, this mosque will rival both the Hagia Sophia and the city's majestic Ottoman architecture. In 2013, the prime minister again seized on the anniversary, this time to officially announce the construction of a third bridge across the Bosphorus. It is to be named after Sultan Selim I (r. 1512-1520), whose reign, although brief, was notable for Ottoman ascendancy over a rival empire in Iran and subsequent Ottoman expansion into the Arab world. 103 For all that political parties began to manipulate the Ottoman legacy in accordance with their own ideologies after 1953, the formal political rehabilitation of the Ottoman Empire that has allowed Prime Minister Erdogan to capitalize on public memory associated with the conquest of Constantinople did not occur until after a military coup in 1980. 104 Initially "neo-Ottomanism" reflected official recognition that Kemalism alone could not resolve decades of intense social tension and public strife in Turkey. 105 Since 1980, it has taken many forms. 106 At the popular level, becomes inherently subversive, and hence threatening. 115 As if in response, however, public memory is remarkably resilient, and societies respond to the iconoclasm and irreverence of the new history by elevating particular sites or lieux de mémoire to unprecedented levels of importance. In the case of Turkey, the popularity of the commemorative culture surrounding Constantinople's conquest illustrates this transformation. The nationalist milieu de mémoire is on the verge of dissolution, but the intensity of public identification with May 29 in Turkey has only increased. The result is that a coherent serial narrative has been replaced by a nostalgic devotion to museums, monuments, and festivals dedicated to a moment onto which Turks can project the ideals they associate with their nation.
To be sure, not all Turks accept the mythology that surrounds the conquest of Constantinople, but public criticism has been limited largely to excesses and exaggerations. 116 Thus, as a post-nationalist historiography has begun to probe the past and reject the creed of national homogeneity, the legacy of Ottoman inclusive cultural pluralism in particular has assumed tremendous popular appeal. 117 Despite the sad irony that quincentenary celebrations were followed in 1955 by intense antiGreek riots in Istanbul, and the fact that expressions of nationalism in Turkey have often been resolutely intolerant of minorities, official statements associated with May 29 commemorations have consistently stressed the rich multicultural nature of the history of the Turkish nation. 118 In this case, commemoration serves not only to put to rest the uncertainties of modernity, but to "sanitize" further the messy history that is part of the nation-state. 119 When Prime Minister Erbakan addressed the crowds in İnönü Stadium on May 29, 1997, he stressed that Turks had an obligation to follow Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror's example and struggle for a "new world" in which not only Islam but also peace and justice would prevail. In so doing, he echoed a theme that had a significant genealogy: rooted in the nineteenth century, the idea that the conquest of Constantinople had been part of the Turkish nation's contribution to world history had been front and center at official public celebrations in 1953, when Turks embarked on their ten days of celebration associated with that moment's 500th anniversary.
The quincentenary, therefore, established a commemorative tradition that continues to resonate six decades later. Even as commemoration has served different purposes, certain themes have endured at the center of a public memory that infuses popular national identity. The first theme is the personification of the nation, the embodiment of national ideals in men central to the narrative of 1453. Two stand out: Ulubatlı Hasan, remembered as the man who died flag in hand as he led troops over the city walls; and Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror. The former became immortalized in popular lore as a giant, fearless man who sacrificed himself for the sake of the nation. He was someone with whom the common Turk might identify, although ironically, as a Janissary he was almost certainly one of the many Ottoman soldiers who were not of Turkish origin. 120 The latter was remembered as a brilliant, determined leader who had ingeniously solved the problems facing Turkish forces laying siege to the city: he designed the fortress known as Rumeli Hisarı on the Bosphorus, he carried out the ballistic calculations necessary for the huge cannons used to breach the walls, and he himself devised the scheme to haul ships from the Bosphorus into the Golden Horn. It was on account of these achievements that Mehmed II was able to do what no other commander laying siege to the city had been able to do before: lead the Turkish nation to launch an assault from all sides, and ultimately to conquer Constantinople. 121 A second theme emphasizes that this success belonged to a Muslim Turkish nation. Prior to 1953, there had been intense debate about the place of Islam in Turkish society, and the appropriate nature of the secular state. Consequently, the elevation of the sultan to the status of national hero alongside Atatürk addressed the palpable tension in Turkey concerning the legacy of secularism. Mehmed II has been remembered as the very paragon of Muslim virtue, following the advice of spiritual advisers confident that he would be the one to lead his nation to fulfill the Prophet's hadith concerning the ultimate conquest of Constantinople. His first act upon entering the city was to visit the great Hagia Sophia, to pray, and to announce that the church would be a mosque from that point forward. The popular narrative of Constantinople's conquest presents Turkish soldiers laying siege to Constantinople as pious men, fighting as holy warriors or gazis, and dying the deaths of martyrs. The word used to describe this monumental moment in Islamic history is fetih-a term of Arabic origin, pregnant with meaning. 122 Thus the victory was the result of a triumphant Muslim Turkish spirit, in distinct contrast to the fate that befell the Christian defenders of the city. Prior to the final assault, the Christian population had beseeched God, calling out for mercy. Then in the final hours they had taken refuge in the Hagia Sophia, believing in a legend that predicted that help would come in the form of an 120 Namık Kemal and Ahmed Muhtar Paşa appear to have been the first Ottoman historians to introduce the person of Ulubatlı Hasan, presumably inspired by references to the account provided by the Austrian Orientalist Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall in his Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches: Von der Gründung des osmanischen Reiches bis zur Eroberung Constantinopels, 1300 -1453 (Pest,1827 122 The Turkish fetih derives from the Arabic fatah ខ a, which denotes both victory and "opening." Thus the very first sura in the Qur an is titled al-f a tih ខ a, "the beginning." angel and drive the Turks out of the city. 123 Such a miracle did not occur, and no sooner had Mehmed the Conqueror occupied Constantinople than he set about establishing it as Istanbul, soon to be synonymous with the richness and greatness of Islamic civilization. 123 Cahid Okurer, Büyük Fetih (Istanbul, 1953) ; Tülbentçi, Istanbul'un Kapılarında. 
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population reject a last-minute union between the Byzantine and Roman churches in return for assistance, but the monk Gennadius-soon to become the Greek patriarch-even announced that he would rather submit to the Turks than to the pope. It thus fell to the Turks to deliver a Greek population trapped in the Middle Ages and longing for freedom and enlightenment. Public commemoration of Constantinople's conquest since 1953 suggests the enduring appeal of these themes to the modern Turkish nation. The appropriation of the imperial past to the national present is one means by which Turks have navigated the uncertainties accompanying the negotiation of their nation for more than half a century. It is hardly surprising that 2012 witnessed the screening of the most expensive and most popular film in Turkish history. The title was Conquest 1453 (Fetih 1453) , and its content is faithful to the themes that emerged in the nineteenth century before being clearly articulated in 1953. 129 These enabled both Ottoman elites and Turkish citizens to locate their imperial nation in world history. Then, as political and social change has called into question the Turkish national narrative in recent years, Turks have reiterated the underlying public memory through a culture of commemoration. At the time of the quincentenary, the world historian Arnold Toynbee and the American publication Freedom & Union called on the world to rejoice that the Turk-personified in both Atatürk and Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror-now stood guard over Istanbul ready to contribute to the ideal of human unity. 130 It is a sentiment with which few Turks would disagree today. 129 Not surprisingly, the lead character is Ulubatlı Hasan. 130 This was the publication associated with Clarence K. Streit, who promoted international cooperation and even political union among democracies for the purpose of ensuring peace. According to Streit, the "terrible Turk" of 1923 had become the "terrific Turk" by 1953: "his story is already a most inspiring one for all who believe in the vast possibilities of human freedom, or struggle against great odds. They can rejoice that he stands guard (New York, 1957) , 253. Needless to say, Greeks took a rather different approach to the quincentenary, something that the Turkish government followed with interest: BCA 030. 01.103.644.7 (May 30, 1953 
